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1. 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
2. 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 1-2 (LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2007).  Section 1 of the Sherman Act states: 
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to
be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or
conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation,
or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both
said punishments, in the discretion of the court.  
Id. § 1.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act states:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with
any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction
thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any
other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said
punishments, in the discretion of the court.
Id. § 2.
3. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 32 (2006).
4. Id.  
5. Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Trident, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
6. Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 396 F.3d 1342, 1352-53 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
7. Id. at 1353.
8. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 545 U.S. 1127 (2005).
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I.  INTRODUCTION
In Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.,1 an ink manufacturer sought
to invalidate patents held by a printing system manufacturer by alleging that the patents
resulted in illegal tying and monopolization in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act.2  This action was preceded by an infringement action brought by Illinois
Tool Works (ITW), which was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.3  Indepen-
dent Ink (Independent) responded by seeking a judgment of noninfringement and
invalidity of patents against ITW.4  The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of ITW on both counts.5  The court of appeals reversed and remanded with
respect to Section 1 of the Sherman Act,6 and affirmed the grant of summary judgment
with respect to Section 2 of the Sherman Act.7  The Supreme Court granted certiorari.8
This case provided the Supreme Court with an opportunity to reconcile the
precarious balance between patents, which supply the holder with exclusive rights, and
antitrust laws, which were developed in an effort to curb market domination.
2008] TYING ARRANGEMENTS AND MARKET POWER 261
9. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006).
10. Id. at 45.
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000).
12. RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 33 (2d ed. 2001).
13. Id. 
14. Id. at 33-35.
15. JAY DRATLER, JR., LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 5.02, at 5-5 (2007).
16. Id.
17. Id.
Specifically, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether market power in a
patented product should be presumed as a matter of antitrust law.9  The Court bridged
the gap between the two overlapping sections of law and ruled that a patent does not
invariably indicate that the holder has market power, thus shifting the burden to the
plaintiff to prove that the defendant has market power in all cases involving a tying
arrangement.10
This Note considers whether the Supreme Court was correct in deciding that there
should be no presumption of market power in tying arrangement cases involving a
patented tying item, as a matter of antitrust law, in addition to matters of patent law.
This Note reviews the backgrounds of antitrust law and patent law, including judicial
and legislative developments, and the overlap of the two areas of law.  This Note then
reviews the history and development of tying arrangements, specifically those dealing
with a patented tying good and an unpatented tied good, and the development of the
“per se” rule and the “rule of reason.”  Finally, this Note concludes that, while the
Supreme Court made the correct decision in Illinois Tool Works, it failed to consider
that its holding will have the effect of placing an entirely new emphasis on the term
“market,” which was previously irrelevant, and the fact that the term “market” leaves
excessive room for discrepancies among parties, potentially creating a flood of
previously inapplicable litigation. 
II.  BACKGROUND
A.  Relevant Antitrust Legislative History
The Sherman Act,11 generally recognized as the basic federal antitrust law, was
passed in 1890, essentially in an attempt to hinder monopolizations present within the
American economy.12  Specifically, it “prohibited contracts, combinations, and con-
spiracies in restraint of trade . . . [and] monopolization and conspiracies and attempts
to monopolize.”13  The Sherman Act borrowed terminology from foreign and American
common law, yet it was not intended to codify the precedent developed by courts over
the years.14  The principles differed from the foreign jurisdictions from which the Act
borrowed by imparting the responsibility of developing and implementing the law on
the courts rather than the legislature.15  In addition, the brevity of the Sherman Act
drew remarks from the Supreme Court comparing it to the United States Constitution,
in that both tend to condemn certain behaviors without specifically defining them.16
As such, much of the antitrust law in the United States has been developed by judges.17
Further confusing the paradigm was the fact that the intended purpose of the legislation
varied from its actual effect; arguably, the main goal of the Act was “to enhance
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18. Id. § 5.02[1], at 5-7.
19. POSNER, supra note 12, at 35.
20. Id.
21. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12, 13, 14-19, 20, 21, 22-27 (2000).
22. POSNER, supra note 12, at 42.
23. George J. Stigler, The Origins of the Sherman Act, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE SHERMAN
ACT 32, 35 (E. Thomas Sullivan ed., 1991).
24. DRATLER, supra note 15, § 5.02[3], at 5-48.6.
25. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2000).
26. Id. § 14.
27. Id. § 18.
28. Id. § 19.
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
30. George Gordon & Robert J. Hoerner, Overview and Historical Development of the Misuse
Doctrine, in ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MISUSE: LICENSING AND
LITIGATION 1, 1 (2000).
31. Id. at 1-2.
32. Id.
consumer welfare by promoting economic efficiency in the operation of business and
industry,”18 yet in effect the statute was written so vaguely that judges were not able
to “translate [it] into coherent, administrable legal doctrine without doing serious and
undesired damage to the economy.”19  Thus, the courts frequently looked to the state
of the economy for guidance.20  
Although the Sherman Act has been generally cultivated by the courts, Congress
still retains the authorization to respond to the Act’s inadequacies.  Congress did just
that in 1914 when it enacted the Clayton Act,21 which attempted to address the
deficiencies with which the courts were struggling in interpreting the Sherman Act.22
The Clayton Act “displayed a concern with predatory competition which probably
reflects . . . opposition to big business.”23  It more explicitly outlined injuries, which
strayed from the “quasi-constitutional character” of the Sherman Act.24  Specifically,
the Act addressed price discrimination,25 tying and exclusive dealing,26 anticompetitive
mergers and acquisitions,27 and interlocking directorates,28 among other things. 
B.  The Doctrine of Patent Misuse
The United States Constitution authorized Congress to develop laws in order “[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”29  Patent law is codified in Title 35 of the United States Code. 
The patent misuse doctrine generally refers to affirmative defense to infringement
cases, and has been effective when the patent holder is either engaging in improper
attempts to lengthen the reach of its patent, or when the patent holder’s conduct
violates antitrust laws.30  Indeed, patent misuse itself is not considered an actionable
tort.31  If there is a finding of misuse, the patent holder is rendered unable to sue for
infringement until the misusing behavior has ceased.32  Although the doctrine of patent
misuse is closely related to antitrust law, it actually arose from the patent law doctrine
2008] TYING ARRANGEMENTS AND MARKET POWER 263
33. Id. at 2-3.
34. Id. at 33.
35. Id. at 75; POSNER, supra note 12, at 197.
36. See POSNER, supra note 12, at 199.  However, Posner points out:
[I]t is important to note that leverage is no more effective when the products are unrelated.
Had IBM refused to sell computers unless the customers agreed to buy cake mix from it, this
would not have enabled IBM to obtain greater profits. The price of the cake mix, minus
whatever value the cake mix had, would have been perceived by the customers as an
addition to the price of the computer.
Id.
37. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
38. 224 U.S. 1 (1912), overruled by Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S.
502 (1917).
39. Id. at 11-12.
40. Id. at 35-36.
41. See id. at 11-12.
42. LAWRENCE SULLIVAN & WARREN GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK,
§ 7.2a, at 388-89 (2000).
43. IBM Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 136 (1936).
of contributory infringement, and the courts declined invitations to more closely relate
the misuse doctrine to antitrust violations.33
In sum, the doctrine of patent misuse has developed from “the prevention of
anticompetitive effects, protection of licensees from overreaching by patentees, and
ensuring compliance with the purposes of the patent laws.”34
C.  The History of Patent Tying
Patent tying is a type of trade restraint where the patent holder requires that the
licensee or buyer purchase related products from the patent holder as well.35  The
“tied” product is almost always a product that is incidental to the “tying” product, as
the arrangement typically would not succeed otherwise.36  The Supreme Court has
defined a tying arrangement as “an agreement by a party to sell one product but only
on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product.”37 
1.  Pre-1952 Patent Act Amendments
Patent tying cases date back to Henry v. A. B. Dick Co.,38 where the plaintiff, A.
B. Dick Co., sold its patented stencil-duplicating machine with the limitation that the
machine be used solely with supplies manufactured by the plaintiff.39  In the ensuing
patent infringement action, the Supreme Court upheld the tie as legitimate40 and only
mentioned the Sherman Act in passing.41  The case provided fuel for supporters of
legislation to further delineate and strengthen antitrust prohibitions on tying
arrangements, and Section 3 of the Clayton Act was enacted soon after.42  Section 3
represented a compromise between directly countering the A. B. Dick holding and still
defining the provisions of the Sherman Act, proscribing ties in the cases when the
effect of a tie “may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly.”43
Although, in effect, the enactment of Section 3 of the Clayton Act overruled A. B.
Dick, the Supreme Court expressly overruled the decision three years after the
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44. 243 U.S. 502, 518 (1917).
45. Id.; Gordon & Hoerner, supra note 30, at 9.
46. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
47. 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
48. Id. at 489. 
49. Id. at 490-91.
50. Id. at 490.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 494. 
53. Id. at 493.
54. 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
55. Id. at 662-63.
56. Id. at 664.
enactment, in Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co.44
There, the seller of a motion picture company’s patented film projector only permitted
that the projectors be used with films that were also patented by Motion Picture Patents
Co., an arrangement that the Supreme Court held unlawful.45 However, while the Supreme
Court’s decision seemed to recognize that A. B. Dick was in violation of public policy, and
that the enactment of Section 3 of the Clayton Act was an articulation of that public policy,
several of the cases that followed illuminated the Supreme Court’s position that not all ties
were unlawful.46  
Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co.,47 where the plaintiff sought an injunction
for infringement of its patents on machines that deposited salt tablets, soon followed.48
The defendant was manufacturing and licensing machines similar enough to the patent
holder’s that the patent holder took action.49  The trial court granted summary judgment
in favor of the defendants, holding that the plaintiff “was making use of the patent to
restrain the sale of salt tablets in competition with its own sale of unpatented tablets,
by requiring licensees to use with the patented machines only tablets sold by
[plaintiff].”50  The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that there
was no evidence that the plaintiff’s behavior tended to create a monopoly in violation
of Section 3 of the Clayton Act.51  The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit
decision, stating that a finding of a violation of the Clayton Act was unnecessary and
asserting that the plaintiff “may not claim protection of his grant by the courts where
it is being used to subvert that policy.”52  Because of its tying arrangements, the
plaintiff had effectively restrained competition in a market in which the plaintiff held
no patent, and this behavior would need to be purged for the patent to become
enforceable.53 
In Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co.,54 the plaintiff, the patent
holder of a domestic heating system that contained an unpatented component, brought
a contributory infringement suit against the defendant for the sale of the unpatented
device within the plaintiff’s system.55  The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was
enjoined from enforcing its patent as long as it continued to attempt to restrain trade
in the market of the unpatented component, and stated that “[the] Court has
consistently held that the owner of a patent may not employ it to secure a limited
monopoly of an unpatented material used in applying the invention.”56  Thus, the
Mercoid decision “effectively eliminated a patent holder’s ability to prevent a
2008] TYING ARRANGEMENTS AND MARKET POWER 265
57. Gordon & Hoerner, supra note 30, at 18.
58. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000).  The code section reads:
Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the United States a
component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a material
or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the
invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an
infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for
substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.
Id.
59. Id. § 271(d).  Subsection (d) reads: 
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory infringement
of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent
right by reason of his having done one or more of the following: (1) derived revenue from
acts which if performed by another without his consent would constitute contributory
infringement of the patent; (2) licensed or authorized another to perform acts which if
performed without his consent would constitute contributory infringement of the patent; (3)
sought to enforce his patent rights against infringement or contributory infringement . . . .
Id.
60. SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 42, § 15.11a, at 884.
61. DRATLER, supra note 15, § 5.02[2][a][ii], at 5-23 (quoting Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania
Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977)).
62. 332 U.S. 392 (1947).  
competitor from making and selling a component that had no use other than as part of
a patented invention.”57  
These cases together established the premise for the 1952 Patent Act
Amendments.  Section 271(c)58 stated that selling non-staple goods specifically made
for use in a patented product would amount to contributory infringement, with Section
271(d) outlining exceptions to that prohibition.59  Although the 1952 Patent Act
amendments effectively narrowed the Mercoid range of contributory infringement, it
failed to address the competitive effect standard for patent misuse.  Thus, tying
arrangements involving a patented tying item were still suspect.60
2.  The Establishment of the Per Se Rule
The per se rule was developed partly in reaction to the difficulties in applying the
previously established rule, called the “rule of reason.”  The rule of reason necessitated
that “the factfinder weigh[] all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a
restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint upon
competition,” which, ostensibly, required a lengthy investigatory period.61  Such an
inquiry could involve analyses of relevant circumstances, including economic fields
and histories.  This type of detailed inquiry often placed a financial burden upon the
parties involved, and undeniably put certain parties at a disadvantage.  The per se rule,
in part, aimed to relieve this burden and place all parties involved in a given case on
a more level playing field.
Before the 1952 Patent Act Amendments, in a case that all but ignored the patent
misuse doctrine and focused on antitrust rules, the Supreme Court delved into the
development of the per se rule for tying arrangements in its holding in International
Salt Co. v. United States.62  The defendant there held patents on two machines that
used salt products, and distributed the machines through leases that required the lessee
266 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1
63. Id. at 394.
64. Id. at 393.
65. Id. at 396.
66. Id.
67. Id.; see also Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15 n.25 (1984) (“The rationale
for per se rules in part is to avoid a burdensome inquiry into actual market conditions in situations where
the likelihood of anticompetitive conduct is so great as to render unjustified the costs of determining
whether the particular case at bar involves anticompetitive conduct.”).
68. The Supreme Court in Morton Salt mentioned the Clayton Act only to state: “The question we must
decide is not necessarily whether respondent has violated the Clayton Act, but whether a court of equity will
lend its aid to protect the patent monopoly when respondent is using it as the effective means of restraining
competition with its sale of an unpatented article.”  Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488,
490 (1942).  The opinion concludes:
It is unnecessary to decide whether respondent has violated the Clayton Act, for we conclude
that in any event the maintenance of the present suit to restrain petitioner’s manufacture or
sale of the alleged infringing machines is contrary to public policy and that the district court
rightly dismissed the complaint for want of equity. 
Id. at 494.
69. 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
70. Gordon & Hoerner, supra note 30, at 40.
71. Id.
to purchase all salt consumed by the patented machines from the patent holder as
well.63  The plaintiff, the United States government, alleged that the tying arrangement
violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and Section 3 of the Clayton Act.64  The
Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the United
States, and affirmed the district court’s further development of the per se rule.65
Regarding the per se rule, the Supreme Court stated that “it is unreasonable, per se, to
foreclose competitors from any substantial market.”66  Although the decision neglected
to specifically refer to market power as a factor in the analysis, it did note that “[t]he
volume of business affected by these contracts cannot be said to be insignificant or
insubstantial and the tendency of the arrangement to accomplishment of monopoly
seems obvious.”67
The International Salt decision was important, apart from establishing the per se
rule, in that it was factually almost indistinguishable from Morton Salt, although two
very different analyses were used in approaching the cases. While Morton Salt was
analyzed mostly with patent laws and almost altogether eschewed the possibility of an
antitrust claim,68 International Salt declared that the earlier patent misuse cases
supported the proposition that this type of a tying arrangement was unlawful under the
Sherman Act, thus unequivocally rendering the per se rule applicable in patent tying
cases. 
3.  Pre-1988 Patent Act Amendments
The per se rule, which was reaffirmed in Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United
States,69 states that a tying arrangement qualifies as patent misuse if the plaintiff can
establish four factors.70  First, it must be established that the arrangement involves two
physically separate items, which speaks more to patent law than antitrust law, and thus
requires a more stringent test of separability.71  Next, the tied product must be a staple
2008] TYING ARRANGEMENTS AND MARKET POWER 267
72. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000).
73. Gordon & Hoerner, supra note 30, at 40.
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 40-41.
76. 371 U.S. 38 (1962), abrogated by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
77. Block-booking is defined as, “[i]n the licensing or use of movies, the practice by film distributors
of conditioning the license or use on the acceptance of an entire package or block of films, which typically
includes unwanted or inferior films.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 182 (8th ed. 2004).
78. Loew’s, 371 U.S. at 40-41.
79. Id. at 45.  Although the decision provided little guidance as to what would constitute “economic
power,” it did state that “[t]he standard of illegality is that the seller must have ‘sufficient economic power
with respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free competition in the market for the tied
product.’” Id. (quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958)).
80. Id. 
81. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
82. Id. at 5.
83. Id. at 12.
item, as Congress explicitly mandated in Section 271(c) of the Patent Act.72  In other
words, the tied product cannot have any practical noninfringing use.73 Third, access to
the tying item must be conditioned on the tied item, whether expressed, via a contract,
or implied, via a packaged deal.74  Finally, the licensor must have sufficient market
power to compel the licensee to accept the agreement.75
In United States v. Loew’s, Inc.,76 the Supreme Court further defined the
applicability of the per se rule.  There, the United States alleged that six major
distributors of copyrighted films were engaging in block-booking77 in violation of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and the district judge agreed.78  The Supreme Court
affirmed, and although it limited the per se application to cases where there has first
been a finding of economic power,79 it also reiterated that “[t]he requisite economic
power is presumed when the tying product is patented or copyrighted.”80  Thus, while
the Loew’s Court somewhat narrowed the cases in which the per se rule would apply,
it also explicitly stated that the mere existence of a patent would denote market power.
The Loew’s holding was slightly undermined some twenty years later, when the
holding in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde81 once again narrowed the
field of possible per se analyses.  There, a board certified anesthesiologist was denied
admission to the medical staff at the East Jefferson Hospital because the hospital was
a party to a contract that stipulated that all of its anesthesiology needs would be
performed by a specific medical corporation.82  The Supreme Court restated its
jurisprudence on product tying:
[T]he essential characteristic of an invalid tying arrangement lies in the seller’s
exploitation of its control over the tying product to force the buyer into the purchase
of a tied product that the buyer either did not want at all, or might have preferred to
purchase elsewhere on different terms.  When such “forcing” is present, competition
on the merits in the market for the tied item is restrained and the Sherman Act is
violated.83
The Supreme Court found that such “forcing” is only feasible when the licensor
has enough market power to compel the licensee to partake in an agreement that they
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84. Id. at 13-14.
85. Id. at 15.
86. Sections 271(d)(4)-(5) of the Patent Act read:
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory infringement
of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent
right by reason of his having done one or more of the following: . . . (4) refused to license
or use any rights to the patent; or (5) conditioned the license of any rights to the patent or
the sale of the patented product on the acquisition of a license to rights in another patent or
purchase of a separate product, unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has
market power in the relevant market for the patent or patented product on which the license
or sale is conditioned.
35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4)-(5) (2000).
87. Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Trident, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1155 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
88. Id. at 1158.  Piezoelectric technology “uses electronic pulses to cause tiny changes in the shape of
a ceramic crystal that can propel droplets of ink out of the printhead at rates as high as 10,000 droplets per
second.”  Brief for Respondent at 3, Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (No. 04-
1329).
89. Indep. Ink, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1159.  The Sherman Antitrust Act is “[a] federal statute, passed in
1890, that prohibits direct or indirect interference with the freely competitive interstate production and
distribution of goods.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1382 (7th ed. 1999).  Explaining the purpose of the
Sherman Act, the Supreme Court states:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed
at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that
the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our
economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress,
while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our
democratic political and social institutions.
N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
would not have agreed to in a competitive market.84  Thus, while the decision bolstered
the market power argument, it ultimately found that the “[p]er se condemnation—
condemnation without inquiry into actual market conditions—is only appropriate if the
existence of forcing is probable.”85   
In 1988, the Patent Act was further amended to include Sections 271(d)(4) and
(5).86  This provision sought to protect patent holders against a misuse claim in the
event of a license conditioned upon the sale of a patented product (a patented tying
arrangement), without a showing of market power in the relevant market.  In sum, the
1988 Amendments clarified that, in cases of alleged patent misuse, a per se analysis is
inappropriate.  So while the Patent Act appeared unambiguous on the issue, the same
matter remained unresolved as a matter of antitrust law, leading us to the decision in
Illinois Tool Works.
III.  THE ILLINOIS TOOL WORKS DECISION
In Independent Ink, Inc. v. Trident, Inc.,87 Independent Ink, Inc. (Independent), a
distributor and supplier of printer ink and ink products, filed suit against Trident, Inc.
(Trident) and Illinois Tool Works, Inc. (ITW), a manufacturer of piezoelectric ink jet
printheads that print bar codes on corrugated materials and kraft paper,88 alleging that
ITW was violating the Sherman Act.89  ITW held a patent on the printhead, which was
the first of its type, as well as a patent on an ink container used by the printhead
2008] TYING ARRANGEMENTS AND MARKET POWER 269
90. Indep. Ink, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1158.
91. Id. 
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Brief for the Petitioners at 9, Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (No. 04-
1329).
97. Id. at 16. 
98. Id.
99. Loew’s, 371 U.S. at 45-46 (citing Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S.
502 (1917); Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931); Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co.,
302 U.S. 458 (1938); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940); Morton Salt Co. v. G.
S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944)).
100. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 96, at 17.
101. Id. at 18 n.4.
system.90  In addition, ITW produced an unpatented ink formulated specifically for use
in its patented printhead system.91  Independent manufactured ink that feasibly could
be used in ITW’s product, but for ITW’s licensing agreements.92
ITW’s systems were mainly used by original equipment manufacturers (OEMs)
to print bar codes on cartons.93  ITW licensed its patented and unpatented products to
OEMs as a package deal, requiring OEMs to exclusively buy and use ITW’s
unpatented ink in conjunction with the patented printer head and ink container.94  The
license also prohibited OEMs from refilling the ink containers with ITW’s ink or
anyone else’s.95
ITW’s overarching argument on appeal was that the existence of a patent on the
tying product should not indicate a presumption of market power.  It argued that
market power was an inappropriate distinguisher of harmful tying and tying that does
not pose any anticompetitive harm.96  
ITW first argued that International Salt was an inappropriate precedent, as the
Supreme Court had not discussed the defendant’s market power when establishing the
illegality of a tying arrangement.97  ITW then asserted that, while the Supreme Court
later provided the reasoning for the market power presumption in Loew’s, the stated
rationale was suspect for several reasons.98  In Loew’s, the Court explained that its
reasoning stemmed from patent misuse cases, in which it was established that patent
holders who employed patent tying arrangements would not be entitled to any
infringement relief, due to the Supreme Court’s reluctance to extend a patent holder’s
economic control over unpatented products.99  ITW questioned the Supreme Court’s
rationale on several bases.  ITW first argued that the cases cited in Loew’s did not
address the issue of whether a patent denoted market power to the degree that antitrust
concerns should be implicated, as the main concern in the noted cases was one of
equity, not one of anticompetitive effects.100  In addition, ITW noted that any reference
to the term “monopoly” referred to the patent holder’s monopoly over its own
particular device, and was not meant to be construed in an antitrust sense.101
Furthermore, ITW argued that the Loew’s interpretation of the International Salt
theory (that any tying arrangement would have anticompetitive consequences) was
faulty, as the Supreme Court simply presumed such consequences to be inevitable, and
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in fact refused to heed the International Salt defendant’s evidence to the contrary.102
Thus, ITW argued that the Supreme Court’s application of the International Salt
theory in Loew’s was “the product of a judicial determination about the appropriate
limits on intellectual property rights and not the result of antitrust analysis.”103
ITW further argued that the Supreme Court’s position on tying agreements,
whether involving intellectual property or not, had changed significantly since
Loew’s.104  While originally the Supreme Court’s assessment of tying agreements was
that they served simply to suppress competition, ITW asserted that the more
contemporary position was to recognize that, while tying agreements certainly could
have anticompetitive effects, whether the effects were an actuality required
“considerable market analysis.”105  In fact, ITW contended, the Supreme Court had
taken steps to apply more stringent market power standards, as evidenced in Jefferson
Parish, defining “market power” as any one seller’s ability to influence prices and
output, and delineating that such market power must be considerable, not merely in
existence yet inconsequential.106  Thus, ITW initially argued that the standard that a
patent conveys the market power necessary to establish an unlawful tie was not based
on a Supreme Court market analysis determination.107
ITW continued by arguing that, regardless, the requisite market power could not
be presumed simply from the existence of a patent.108  ITW pointed out that the
Supreme Court had routinely refused to extract the presumption of market power from
the mere existence of a patent or copyright, and asserted that there was no rational
justification for treating such cases any differently simply because there was a tying
arrangement.109  Moreover, ITW stressed that there was no empirical evidence to
suggest that a patent conferred market power, and thus a presumption of one was
inappropriate.110  In fact, ITW pointed out that, quite to the contrary, the existence of
a patent only conferred complete power over that exact product; other functionally
similar products (perhaps patented themselves) might present adequate competition to
undermine any market power.111
In addition to simply having no reason to maintain this presumption, ITW argued
that the presumption actually had a negative market effect, by penalizing procompeti-
tive behavior and encouraging unjustified litigation.112  First, ITW argued that most
tying arrangements were economically beneficial, by ensuring quality and low costs,
and increasing value and price competition, as well as aiding market entry.113  Thus,
ITW contended, it followed that patent ties could have the same procompetitive
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effect.114  Second, it argued, litigation was promoted in that, as it stood, the presump-
tion could only be rebutted through “expert testimony or other credible economic
evidence of the cross-elasticity of demand, the area of effective competition, or other
evidence of lack of market power.”115  In fact, any pre-litigation showing of
uncontested evidence of competitive market substitutes “is not sufficient to rebut the
presumption.”116  The amount and type of evidence necessary to rebut the presumption
involved vast amounts of data collection and economic analysis, which could bear
enormous costs that many patent holders would not be able to support, conceivably
rendering certain patent holders at the mercy of even the most nebulous accusations.117
Furthermore, ITW pointed out that federal enforcement agencies have refused to adopt
any sort of market power presumption when an intellectual property was at issue, based
on the rationale that intellectual property rights only confer complete market power
with respect to a specific product, not an entire market.118  Further bolstering its
contention, ITW indicated the bulk of academic opinion in all facets of antitrust law
called for the abandonment of the market power presumption.119  Finally, ITW argued
that reliance on the lack of Congressional action to address the market presumption
issue was inappropriate, because Congress had mandated through the Sherman Act that
the courts develop antitrust law through common law.120  Thus, ITW concluded,
Congress would have needed to explicitly withdraw that authorization for the Supreme
Court to consider Congressional inaction in making its decision.121
Independent developed its case for the Supreme Court by laying down a roadmap
of ITW’s position in the ink market, and Independent’s own interactions with the
market and with ITW.  Independent indicated that ITW dominated the market for
inkjet printers as a result of its patent, emphasizing ITW’s own concession of this
fact.122  Indeed, according to Independent, ITW’s licenses accounted for over 95% of
high resolution inkjet systems for carton bar coding purposes, in a market that saw an
increase in demand totaling over $115 million in five years.123  Independent conceded
that, while two other companies, Markem and Xaar, had begun selling similar
commercial inkjet printers since the initiation of the lawsuit, these companies were
struggling to make an appreciable dent in the market, accounting cumulatively for only
15% of sales.124
Furthermore, Independent asserted that ITW took advantage of its dominant
position in its niche market by attempting to also dominate ink sales through its
licensing techniques.125  These licensing agreements not only extended to buyers of its
product, but also to customers of said buyers, thus effectively manipulating its patent
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to shut other manufacturers out of a market in which ITW did not hold patents.126
Independent proclaimed that ITW’s own customers expressed dismay with the intense
restrictions placed upon them by the licensing agreements, complaining about the
“tremendous price” they needed to pay for ITW’s ink, as well as expressing an interest
in comparable inks entering the market.127  When Independent tried to “fill the
demands of [ITW’s] customers” with comparable product at a fraction of ITW’s price,
ITW reacted “not by lowering its ink prices, but by trying to exclude its competitors
from the ink market.”128  Independent argued that ITW attempted to convince its
customers that third party ink would “cause corrosion, clogging, and even fires,”129 and
“bullied” its customers into compliance with the tying arrangement by threatening legal
action.130
In addition, Independent argued that, to rule in favor of ITW, the Supreme Court
would need to overturn fifty years of settled law stating that, in patent cases involving
tying agreements, market power is presumed.131  Independent argued that this
presumption of market power in patent tying cases has been recognized by the
Supreme Court since its decision in International Salt Co., Inc. v. United States132 in
1947.133  Since then, Independent asserted, the Supreme Court had reaffirmed its
decision to recognize the patent tying presumption in Standard Oil Co. of California
v. United States,134 Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States,135 Times-Picayune
Publishing Co. v. United States,136 United States v. Loew’s, Inc.,137 Jefferson Parish
Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde,138 United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc.,139
and Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp.140  
Furthermore, Independent asserted that Congress’s enactment of the Clayton
Act,141 in response to Henry v. A. B. Dick Co.,142 indicated that Congress “plainly
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intended Section 3 to overrule the A. B. Dick decision and to condemn arrangements
in which sale of a patented product is conditioned on the sale of other separate
goods.”143  After the enactment of the Clayton Act, Independent claimed that the
Supreme Court continued to apply the principles enumerated in the Clayton Act in
patent tying cases, such as Motion Picture Patents Co.144
Independent then argued that the market power presumption should be upheld
because it was a fair and efficient way to structure proof in tying cases.145  Specifically,
Independent claimed that it was simply an economic reality that the types of patents
involved in tying cases tended to be highly valuable, and thus inherently confer market
power.146  In addition, Independent noted that ITW tended to erroneously focus on
patents in general, and not patents involved in tying arrangements, and that the Court
never asserted that most patents confer market power, only those with tying
arrangements.147  Along those lines, Independent pointed out that the typical customer
would be unwilling to agree to a conditioned purchase agreement unless the
commodity were highly valuable, and likewise, unless there was no market
competition.148  Independent stressed that requirement ties, like the one in the present
case, were generally utilized to make the price vary with the customer’s usage, which
amounts to price discrimination, which, in turn, was evidence of market power.149  In
a competitive market, Independent argued, consumers were only likely to accept tying
arrangements when forced to do so because of the seller’s market power.150
Independent then argued that the presumption of market power in patent tying
cases benefited the public by alleviating the extensive market analysis burden on small
businesses, which would help to ensure that meritorious claims were heard.151  In
addition, Independent noted that the patent holder could rebut the presumption by
presenting evidence that the patented product had close market substitutes, and that the
patent holder was the correct party to uphold this burden. 152  Independent asserted that
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ITW’s argument that Xaar and Markem constituted market substitutes was rightfully
rejected by the Court of Appeals, because those companies did not begin to operate
until a year after the advent of the case at hand, and the products did not constitute
substitutes close enough to ITW’s product.153  Independent proceeded to argue that the
correct venue to address the market power presumption was in Congress, which had
repeatedly declined opportunities to eliminate it on several occasions.154
In its decision in Illinois Tool Works, the Supreme Court immediately noted that
the 1988 amendment to the Patent Act to include Sections 271(d)(4)-(5)155 had
eliminated the market power presumption in patent cases, yet the Court now faced the
question of whether the presumption should survive in the antitrust context.156  The
majority recognized the changing view of tying arrangements, referring to an earlier
comment by Justice Black:
[D]ecisions rejecting the need for proof of truly dominant power over the tying
product have all been based on a recognition that because tying arrangements
generally serve no legitimate business purpose that cannot be achieved in some less
restrictive way, the presence of any appreciable restraint on competition provides a
sufficient reason for invalidating the tie.157  
Thus, the Supreme Court acknowledged the economic shift that allowed for tying
arrangements to have some goal other than to constrain competition within a particular
market and recognized the need to react accordingly. The Supreme Court then
explained that its opinion in Jefferson Parish described that, while a tying arrangement
may not necessarily indicate patent misuse, any “contract to sell a patented product on
condition that the purchaser buy unpatented goods exclusively from the patentee is a
per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.”158  In other words, the inquiry focused on
market conditions, not just on the behavior of the patent holder.
The Supreme Court then went on to acknowledge the intertwining of patent and
antitrust laws in International Salt, but noted the subsequent untwining through
congressional action, which led to the present reexamination of the per se illegality of
tying arrangements involving a patented tie.159  The Court stated that it was “clear that
Congress did not intend the mere existence of a patent to constitute the requisite
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‘market power’” in its enactment of Section 271(d)(5),160 and that although the
amendment did not speak directly to antitrust laws, it elicited a reassessment of the per
se rule in the antitrust context.161  Taking this into consideration, the Supreme Court
noted that, while some tying arrangements were certainly unlawful, there needed to be
an inquiry into the relevant market to determine evidence of market power.162
The Supreme Court also rejected Independent’s suggestion of a rebuttable
presumption of market power in tying arrangements involving a patented tying product
and an unpatented tied product and the suggestion that the Court: 
differentiate between tying arrangements involving the simultaneous purchase of two
products that are arguably two components of a single product—such as the provision
of surgical services and anesthesiology in the same operation . . . or the licensing of
one copyrighted film on condition that the licensee take a package of several films in
the same transaction . . . —and a tying arrangement involving the purchase of
unpatented goods over a period of time, a so-called “requirements tie.”163
In rejecting the proposed alternatives, the Supreme Court noted that, in
International Salt, it was the mere existence of the patent on the tying product that led
the Court to presume market power, and that price discrimination and evidence of an
above-market price for the tied item were both factors that could indicate market
power, but alone were not sufficient to do so fully, and thus were not proper markers
thereof.164  Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s holding reiterated part of the standing law:
a tying arrangement is a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act when the
seller or licensor conditions the sale of its patented product on the buyer or licensee’s
agreement to also purchase or lease a second product, patented or unpatented, and the
patent holder has market power in the tying product market.165
IV.  THE “MARKET DEFINITION” ISSUE
The Supreme Court’s holding in Illinois Tool Works was hardly a shock to the
bulk of the legal community.  Although the burden shift that will take place in the cases
to follow will undoubtedly affect small businesses, the holding also reflects the
generally accepted trend toward acknowledgment that while patents unequivocally
confer market power, the only safe and fair presumption is that the patent holder has
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market power over that patented item.  In other words, although a patent holder holds
exclusive rights to that item, there very well may be substitutes within the market.  In
recognizing this, the Supreme Court has effectively paralleled anti-trust laws with
patent laws, resulting in the alignment of Congressional intent and Supreme Court
precedent.  As it stood, in both patent misuse and antitrust cases involving patented
tying arrangements, the plaintiff would have to prove: 1) two distinct products were
involved; 2) the tied item was a staple item; 3) the sale of one good was conditioned
on the sale of another; and 4) the licensor had market power over the tying product’s
market.166  Before Illinois Tool Works, if the licensor was a patent holder, and the
patented machine was the one at issue, the fourth prong was presumed.  Now, it is the
responsibility of the plaintiff to make specific inquiries into the appropriate market and
present evidence, rebuttable by the defendant, as to the influence the patent holder
holds over the market.
Among the possible effects and implications such a holding will have on the
application of antitrust laws, poised at the front line of issues is that of the exact
definition of “market.”167  Whereas previously the exact definition and boundaries of
a particular market were irrelevant to the analysis, litigation will now inevitably focus
on the data a plaintiff will present to prove market power, along with any evidence the
defendant will bring to rebut the plaintiff’s data.  The opportunity for discrepancies
among interpretation of which market is the relevant market are boundless because the
literal wording in patent law, antitrust law, and judicial history fail to provide useful
parameters.
The Department of Justice’s 1995 Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of
Intellectual Property provided insight into the issue.  Although the Guidelines were
written prior to Illinois Tool Works, they were written after Jefferson Parish and
clearly endorse the essence of the Illinois Tool Works decision.  The Guidelines denote
that “[t]he Agencies, (the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission) will not presume that a patent, copyright, or trade secret necessarily
confers market power upon its owner.”168  In addition, the Guidelines were written to
“assist those who need to predict whether the Agencies will challenge a practice as
anticompetitive,” and consequently “cannot remove judgment and discretion in
antitrust law enforcement.”169  Thus, while limited in its applicability, the Guidelines
are helpful in defining possible markets and indicate just how difficult it may prove to
be to define which market is relevant. 
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The Guidelines define three types of markets relevant to evaluating the effects of
a licensing arrangement.  In addition to the following types of product markets, a
product’s geographical market must also be taken into consideration.170  Generally, the
relevant geographic market is the “area in which the seller operates, and to which the
purchaser can practicably turn for supplies” or services.171
First and foremost are goods markets, which can include any number of different
sub-markets.  However, the inquiry into whether a licensing arrangement has
competitive effects can include inquiries into “markets for final or intermediate goods
made using the intellectual property, or [whether there are] effects upstream, in markets
for goods that are used as inputs, along with the intellectual property, to the production
of other goods.”172  
The Guidelines also describe the technology market.  These markets consist of a
licensed good and its close substitutes—in other words, “the technologies or goods that
are close enough substitutes significantly to constrain the exercise of market power
with respect to the intellectual property that is licensed.”173  From there, however, the
technology’s “close substitutes” must be identified.  To do this, “the smallest group of
technologies and goods over which a hypothetical monopolist of those technologies
and goods likely would exercise market power,” must be ascertained.174   According
to the Agencies, depending on the types of technologies, further evidence that could
pertain to competitive significance can include “evidence of buyers’ and market
participants’ assessments of the competitive significance of technology market partici-
pants,” whether “competing technologies are comparably efficient,” and “the best
available information to estimate market acceptance.”175
Finally, a separate market analysis is prescribed for research and development
(R&D) and innovation markets.  Here, the Agencies recommend analyzing an impact
on competition to innovate “either as separate competitive effect in relevant goods or
technology markets, or as a competitive effect in a separate innovation market,” which
recognizes the possible difficulty in adequately addressing innovation analyses, taking
into consideration, for example, the development of goods that are still in
production.176  Specifically, however, the Agencies recognize that an innovation market
contains new or improved goods or processes and the close substitutes.  “Close
substitutes” can include “[R&D] efforts, technologies, and goods that significantly
constrain the exercise of market power with respect to the relevant [R&D].”177  Here,
again, the Agencies suggest taking into account “all relevant evidence.”178  This can
include “market share data,” “evidence of buyers’ and market participants’ assessments
of the competitive significance of innovation market participants,” presence of “shares
of identifiable assets or characteristics upon which innovation depends, on shares of
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research and development expenditures, or on shares of a related product.”179  Thus,
while the Guidelines use broad norms that allow for room to challenge a license,
theoretically, the relevant market in which to analyze a patent tie “will always be the
market in which that [patent] competes against other technologies.”180
V.  CONCLUSION
The standards created by the Guidelines have been criticized as “inevitably
[relying] on speculative assessments . . . and inaccurate definitions of the relevant
market.”181  Any ultimate ruling can turn on the definition a given court accepts and
“policy actions based on narrower market definitions would fail to recognize the
competitive effects of excluded suppliers” while “[p]olicy decisions based on broader
market definitions might miss harms to competition that are masked by the improper
inclusion of non-competitors.”182  In addition, the Guidelines’ preoccupation with the
“hypothetical monopolist” may prove to be less tangible than necessary.  
In order to most effectively apply the Guidelines, it is important to consider the
policy reasoning behind the market power inquiry.  Market power is simply a manner
of showing the effects of economic conduct, and conceivably this inquiry can be
replaced with a thorough consideration of any evidence of harm to any competition.183
Moreover, “[defining the market] serves only as an analytical framework for
identifying the unlawful exercise of market power.”184  By considering any anti-
competitive effect as a replacement for market power, a court would be able to skip the
market definition altogether and simply assume that a showing of anti-competitive
effect in any given market makes the patent holder a member of the market.
Conceivably, this could make a patent holder a member of any number of markets
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simultaneously.  This inquiry into the purpose of defining the market is arguably more
important than actually defining that market.  With each inquiry, the court should ask,
“What is the antitrust question in this case that market definition aims to answer?”185
This case-by-case, ex ante inquiry becomes especially important in the context of
patent ties, as the existence of a patent necessarily confers market power to some
degree (albeit solely over the patented item). 
In abolishing the presumption of market power in patent tie cases as a matter of
antitrust law, the Supreme Court took an affirmative step to recognize the trend of
economic attitudes.  The consequences, though potentially far-reaching, have yet to
come to fruition, and the legal community must wait to discover the actual effects of
the decision. 
